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NOTES
COMPULSORY TESTIMONY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
An awakening to the threat of the communist conspiracy has
effected extensive programs of investigation and prosecution in the
past decade.' Law enforcement authorities, thwarted in their efforts
to obtain information vital to prosecution for subversive activities,
sought statutory aid to compel essential testimony. 2 Frustrated by
the repetitious invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination-which saw in two years almost six hundred of its
witnesses seek refuge through its exercise, 3 Congress was ready to
supply the needed reform.4 A federal compulsory testimony act
resulted.5 This immunity act, expressly directed at seditious con-
spiracy endangering national security, 6 seeks to obtain needed testi-
mony by affording protection from prosecution to selected witnesses.
Upon implementation of the statute, a witness can no longer rely upon
his privilege against self-incrimination.
1 For discussion of the problems relating to legislative investigations, see
Gilligan, Congressional Investigations, 41 J. GRIM. L., C. & P.S. 618 (1951);
Levi, Congressional Investigations, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 421 (1951); Williams,
Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FORDHAM L. REkv. 19 (1955); Note,
45 ILL. L. REv. 633 (1950).
2 Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of
the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 16, at 1130-31 (1954);
see Brownell, Immunity From Prosecution Versus Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 28 TUL. L. REv. 1, 13 (1953).
3 In 1953, 317 witnesses invoked the privilege. See HoFSTAD-ER, THE
FIH AMENDMENT AND THE IMMUNITY AcT OF 1954 20 (1956). In 1954,
266 witnesses sought refuge in the privilege. 101 CONG. REc. 11316 (daily ed.
Aug. 3, 1955).
4 See Finkelhor and Stockdale, The Professor and the Fifth Amendment,
16 U. PiTT. L. REv. 344, 356-57 (1955).
5 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. II, 1954).
6 Subsections a and c recite as the subjects of the act "... any interference
with or endangering of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger,
the national security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage,
espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy .... ." In addition, a, which deals with
congressional investigations, adds "the overthrow of its Government by force
or violence." And c, which concerns grand jury or court proceedings, adds in
detail ". . . violations of chapter 115 of title 18 of the United States Code, viola-
tions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 987), violations of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 755), as amended, violations of sections
212(a) (27), (28), (29) or 241(a) (6), (7) or 313(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (66 Stat. 182-186; 204-206; 240-241), and conspiracies involv-
ing any of the foregoing . . . ." Ibid.
NOTES
. . . [S]uch witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing
books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture. But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty
or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning
which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled
be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding. against him in any court.7
The exemption thus granted, however, is not unrestricted; for there
is no immunization against prosecution for perjury committed during
the compelled proceedings.8 The statute is designed to satisfy the
demands of both the investigative and enforcement bodies, since evi-
dence may be compelled both before congressional committees and in
grand jury and court proceedings.
The problem of requiring recalcitrant witnesses to supply infor-
mation important to the unimpeded exercise of governmental function
is not new.9 Nor is the solution-the exchange of immunity for that
information. In England, the device has been employed for more
than two hundred years, beginning with special legislation enacted
to obtain the statements of specified individuals. 10 Later, much im-
munity legislation was introduced into criminal and regulatory law. 11
A great majority of the states of the United States, realizing the
practical efficacy of statutory immunity, have enacted like provisions.
12
Compulsory Testimony and Immunity
1957 will mark the centennial of the first federal immunity pro-
vision.13 Designed to facilitate a congressional investigation into
corruption, the statute was nevertheless phrased so loosely as to per-
vert a general policy of law enforcement. A witness could volunteer
unresponsive answers, disclosing personal malefaction, and insure his
freedom from prosecution.1 4 Wrongdoers eagerly sought the chance
718 U.S.C. § 3486(c) (Supp. II, 1954).
8 Subsection d provides that "no witness shall be exempt under the pro-
vision of this section from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed
while giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion. . . ." Id.
§ 3486(d).
9 See Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1949) ; United States
v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
20 See, e.g., Trial of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield, 16 How. St. Tr. 767,
921, 1147 (1725).
"E.g., Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Gro. 5, c. 50; Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5
GEo. 5, c. 59; Corrupt & Illegal Practice Prevention Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vxcr.,
c. 51.
12 See 8 WIGMOoa, EvwmNcE § 2281 n.11 (3d ed. 1940).
13 11 STAT. 156 (1857).
24 See King, Immunity for Witnesses: An Inventory of Caveats, 40 A.B.A.J.
377, 380 (1954) ; Smelser, The Grand Inquest of the Nation, 29 NoRnm DA E
LAW. 163, 171 (1954).
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to testify and to take the "immunity bath." 15 In reaction, Congress
withdrew the quarantine against prosecution for compelled testimony,
amending the law so that the remaining shield protected only against
the use of the compelled testimony in a later criminal action.' 6 Some
thirty years after the passage of this amendment, the Supreme Court
pointed out in Counselman v. Hitchcock,'7 the ineffectiveness of the
statute as a method of coercing important disclosures. In that case,
a witness, ordered to testify, was held to have validly refused to do so,
properly remaining silent because of the constitutional prohibition
against self-incrimination. Since the statute did not inhibit the use
of other evidence obtained as a result of the lead supplied by the
original testimony, the immunity was found not to be as broad as the
constitutional privilege. Thus, the privilege remained. This emas-
culated law remained in effect with but minor change until the adop-
tion of the present federal compulsory testimony act.' 8
Nonetheless, in other fields of public law, the immunity theory
found frequent and efficient use. The first successful provision was
incorporated into the Interstate Commerce Act.1 Congress, adhering
to standards outlined by the Supreme Court,20 provided- that there
could be no prosecution resulting from any evidence supplied by the
immunized witness. This statute finally found approval by the
Supreme Court,2 ' which held that the protection afforded by the law
was extensive enough to encompass the fullest freedom from self-
incrimination allowed by the Constitution. The enactment, coextensive
with the constitutional protection, was therefore not repugnant to the
Constitution. The success of this law led to similar provisions in other
federal administrative fields including agriculture,22 regulation of
business, 23 power,2 4 labor,25 communications, 26 welfare, 27 and national
defense.
28
15 See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Congressional Power of Investi-
gation, S. Doc. No. 99, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1954).
16 12 STAT. 333 (1862).
17 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
18 See Legis. Note, 29 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 153, 154 (1954).
1927 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. §46 (1952).
20 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
21 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
22 Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 46 STAT. 536 (1930), 7 U.S.C.
§ 499m (1952).
23 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u
(1952).
24 Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 856 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825 (1952).
25 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley), 61 STAT. 136,
29 U.S.C. § 161 (1952).26 Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1097 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 409(1)
(1952).
27 Social Security Act, 53 STAT. 1370 (1939), 42 U.S.C. § 405(f) (1956).
28 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 771 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §-1812(a) (3)
(1952).
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The present federal compulsory testimony act was carefully
drafted to obviate defects of prior legislation. 29  There are ample
checks against a hasty or possibly unjustified grant of freedom from
prosecution. The sections applicable to congressional inquiry require
at least a majority vote,30 notification of the Attorney General, and
an order by a federal district court compelling testimony. The section
pertaining to grand jury and court testimony is equally restricted.
The district court will order the witness to testify only after the
United States Attorney conducting the inquiry determines the testi-
mony to be important and the Attorney General concurs. The new
act further provides protection coextensive with the privilege in that
it forbids prosecution in a criminal proceeding "for or on account of
any" of the coerced evidence. 31 The danger of "immunity baths" is
effectively precluded. The problem of voluntary and unresponsive
answers given by a witness to secure the shelter of the statute is
avoided by the requirement that the constitutional privilege be first
invoked and by the procedural necessity that the immunity process
can be initiated only by the questioners. In addition, the complexity
of the process effectively eliminates threats of conspiracy between in-
vestigator and witness to obtain amnesty. 32 Faced with no possibility
of evasion, the witness, willing or not,3 3 must answer or face contempt
charges.
The Ullmann Case
William L. Ullmann was the first witness to be placed in this
dilemma.3 4  Appearing before a grand jury investigating espionage
29 See H.R. REP. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
30 "[WIhen the record shows that-
"(1) in the case of proceedings before one of the Houses of Congress,
that a majority of the members present of that House; or
"(2) in the case of proceedings before a committee, that two-thirds of the
members of the full committee shall by affirmative vote have authorized such
witness to be granted immunity under this section with respect to the transac-
tions, matters, or things concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed
his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce evidence by direc-
tion of the presiding officer . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a) (Supp. II, 1954).
31 Thus, the defect of a law which was merely directed at testimony and
allowed the privilege to survive Lsee Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892) ] is avoided.
32 There would have to be a widespread conspiracy indeed to force an un-
meritorious claim for immunity past the checks of the initial stage-the vote
of Congressmen or request by. the United States Attorney; the intermediate
stage of notification, or approval by, the Attorney General; and the final
check-the order of the federal district court.
33 See United States v. Fitzgerald, 235 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1956). In this
case, defendant was convicted of contempt of court for refusal to testify before
a grand jury after the process of the compulsory testimony statute was utilized.
In affirming the conviction, the court rejected defendant's contention that he
was relieved of compulsion because of his express rejection of the immunity
tendered.
34 See Note, 31 IND. L.J. 208, 210 (1956) ; 1 N.Y.L. FORUm 254 (1955).
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activity directed at national security, Ullmann refused to answer in-
criminating questions on the basis of his constitutional privilege. One
week after this refusal, the United States Attorney, regarding the tes-
timony as vital to public interest,3 5 and after obtaining the approval
of the Attorney General, applied to the federal district court for an
order compelling answers. Three months later the district court so
ordered. Ullmann, again before the grand jury, refused to answer 36
and was subsequently convicted of contempt.3 7 On appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, sustaining the constitutionality
of the immunity act.
A major contention presented by Ullmann was that the statute
was not a sufficient substitute for the constitutional privilege since it
did not afford protection against state prosecution. In the alternative,
it was contended that Congress could not constitutionally so extend
protection. Justice Frankfurter, author of the Court's majority opin-
ion, refuted both arguments.
The Immunity Act is concerned with the national security. It reflects a con-
gressional policy to increase the possibility of more complete and open disclosure
by removal of fear of state prosecution. We cannot say that Congress' para-
mount authority in safeguarding national security does not justify the restric-
tion it has placed on the exercise of state power for the more effective exercise
of conceded federal power.38
The additional question of whether immunity from state prosecu-
tion need be granted 3 9 had been considered by the Court before.4 0
In United States v. Murdock 41 a taxpayer was indicted for failure to
supply information necessary in the computation of his federal income
tax. The taxpayer refused to give information, contending that to do
35 Possibly indicative of the considered application of the immunity act and
the nature of the desired testimony is the fact that Ullmann had been identified
as a member of a communist espionage group in testimony before a congressional
investigating committee. See, e.g., Hearings Before the House Un-American
Activities Committee, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., at 525 (1948) ; Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1953).3
" Ullmann had appeared before congressional committees on previous occa-
sions each time refusing to affirm or deny the allegations -of his complicity in
the communist conspiracy. See House Committee on Un-American Activities,
The Shameful Years 61 (1951); Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Inves-
tigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 16, at 1191-1214 (1954).37 Ullmann was convicted of contempt and sentenced to six months im-
prisonment "unless he should purge himself of the contempt." Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 425 (1956).
38 Id. at 436.
39 This question is implicit in the first-mentioned Ullmann contention that
Congress did not protect against state prosecution.
40 See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 381 (1905); Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591, 606 (1896); cf. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
41284 U.S. 141 (1931).
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NOTES
so would put him in jeopardy of state prosecution. The Supreme
Court dismissed this argument, stating that "this court has held that
immunity against state prosecution is not essential to the validity of
federal [immunity] statutes .... The principle established is that full
and complete immunity against prosecution by the government com-
pelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished
by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination." 42 The view that
protection against self-incrimination need be provided only by the gov-
ernment which seeks the information 43 was endorsed in Feldman v.
United States.44 A judgment debtor, called as a witness in state pro-
ceedings, was forced to testify under a state immunity statute. In a
subsequent federal criminal prosecution for using the mails to defraud,
brought against this witness, the prior "immune" testimony was in-
troduced into evidence resulting in his conviction. The Supreme
Court recognized that a state could not prevent subsequent derivative
criminal action by the federal government 45 and held that "the im-
munity from prosecution, like the privilege against testifying which it
supplants, pertains to a prosecution in the same jurisdiction." 4
Legislative history surrounding the enactment of the new com-
pulsory testimony statute demonstrates considerable doubt among the
drafters whether they would be empowered to proscribe state
prosecution.47  In order to insure the constitutionality and the efficacy
of the proposed statute, the alternate method of outlawing only the
coerced testimony was incorporated. That this latter provision was
valid was not in question, since a recent Supreme Court opinion 48 had
sustained a similar statute which barred the subsequent use of coerced
testimony in both federal and state proceedings. Congress left reso-
lution of the problem of prohibiting state prosecution to the Supreme
Court,49 merely stating that no "witness shall be prosecuted" in any
subsequent proceedings.50 Thus, it did not explicitly preclude state
prosecution. On the other hand, the legislature had already clearly
42 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931).
43 But see United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
In that case, a witness was held to have validly invoked the privilege because
of fear of incrimination involving state crimes. The witness was testifying
before a congressional committee investigating state crimes.
44 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
45 See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
46 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 493 (1944). It is interesting to
note that Justice Frankfurter, writing the majority decision in this case, relied
in part on Brow v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Twelve years later in the
Ullmann case, Justice Frankfurter relied on Brown v. Walker as supporting
his decision that immunity be extended to both jurisdictions. Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
47 See I . REP. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 21 Sess. 7 (1954).
48 Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
49 "The answer to the precise question is not too clear. . . .In any event,
the question can only be resolved by a decision of the Supreme Court." H.R.
REP. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1954).
50 18 U.S.C. § 3486(c) (Supp. II, 1954).
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expressed its desire that state prosecution not be inhibited. This is
evidenced by another section~l in the federal criminal code, which
encompasses the immunity act, providing that "nothing in this title
shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of
the several States under the laws thereof." 52 The Supreme Court
more than half a century before in construing this section had said
that "it was intended to leave with the state court, unimpaired, the
same jurisdiction over the act that it would have had if Congress had
not passed an act on the subject." 53
The broad question, asked by the Congress and answered by the
Court, is whether Congress had the constitutional power to eliminate
state prosecutions.54 In responding affirmatively, the Court relied on
the power to provide for national defense and the complementary
necessary and proper clause. 5 5 It may be contended that the assump-
tion of exclusive power by the federal government runs afoul of the
tenth amendment concept of delegated federal powers and residuary
states' rights.56 Alexander Hamilton, discussing this concept, ,con-
sidered alienation of state sovereignty valid, where a federal authority
is granted, only when ". . . a similar authority in the States would
be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugndant." 57 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall also turned his attention to the seriousness of interfer-
ence with a state's penal provisions,-establishing that the intention to
interfere be "clearly and unequivocally expressed." 58
In the absence of unequivocal language and totally repugnant
state action, the Supreme Court has sustained the exercise of the
state police power on several occasions.59 The case of Gilbert v.
Minnesota 60 involved a conviction under a Minnesota statute that
forbade discouraging the enlistment of citizens in the armed forces of
the United States. 61 The majority, despite the constitutional delega-
5118 U.S.C. § 3231 (1952).
52 Ibid.
53 Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1903).
54 The Ullmann case decided one week before Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956), may have forecast the latter decision. In the Nelson case,
the Supreme Court held that federal legislation could, and did, preclude state
sedition laws.
55 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 436 (1956); see U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
56 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 186 (Lodge ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
58 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 443 (1821).
59 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Fox v. Ohio, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1846).
60254 U.S. 325 (1920).
61 The statute made it a misdemeanor "... to advocate or teach . . . that
men should not enlist in the military . . or . . . aid or assist the United States
in prosecuting or carrying on war.... " Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325,
326-27 (1920).
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tion of the war-making power to Congress, held that the police power
of the state to legislate within this field was not invalidly exercised.
In a dissenting opinion Justice Brandeis vainly pointed out that the
state statute was inconsistent with federal legislation 62 and that the
latter was exclusive. In comparing the decision in the Gilbert case
with what was said in Ulkatann, it becomes difficult to determine
why state prosecution would be totally inconsistent and repugnant to
a federal law manifesting an exercise of authority under the national
defense clause in the latter case, and not in the former.
The reasoning of the Ullnuann decision seems to present an aber-.
ration from settled law.64  Not only had it been established that the
federal constitutional privilege may not be invoked by a witness in
state proceedings, 65 but it had been made clear that the privilege
against self-incrimination could not be invoked in federal proceedings
because of fear of state prosecution. 6 The Ullmann case allows a
federal statute, however, to extend immunity from prosecution to state-
actions. The result is that if a witness before a federal tribunal, relies
on his constitutional privilege, he is not protected from subsequent
state prosecuti6n; but, if he is fortunati enough to be extended the
benefit of the statute, his protection is assured. Thus, the statutory
immunity granted is greater than the constitutional privilege it re-
places. In this respect, the Constitution is powerless while a statute
grants amnesty.
It would, of course, seem undeniable that unless all prosecution
-federal and state-is eliminated, there is no true immunity. To say
that a witness, though safe from federal prosecution but subject to
state process, is really "immune" is to be blind to reality. The
Ullnann decision, then, may be attacked not because it extended im-
munity but because it extended immunity at the expense of the' con-
stitutional concept of delimited federal and residual state power. In
addition, the question of full immunity from prosecution is not the
sole defect in the compulsory testimony statute. A witness making a
full and truthful disclosure under the immunity process is still not
protected from a vindictive prosecution for perjury.67 Wrongful
criminal prosecution based on false information has not been unknown
in the past, and the statute presents nothing to prevent a repetition
of such injustice. Finally, it is clear that the statute grants no amnesty
62 The federal espionage act of 1917, 40 STAT. 217 (1917).
63 See Text at note 38 supra.
64 But see 58 W. VA. L. Rv. 420 (1956) which considers the Ullmann case
as merely ". . . reaffirming the proposition that Congress has the authority
to deny a witness the privilege against self-incrimination and thereby, can
compel hinto testify where the statute grants complete immunity to the wit-
ness from prosecution concerning such matters." Id. at 421-22.
Or See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
66United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). See Text at note 34
supra.
67 See note 8 supra.
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from the social and economic opprobrium that would follow testimony
under the statute.68 It can be contended that the constitutional privi-
lege itself does not protect reputation, 69 or avoid disgrace and
humiliation.7" Likewise, the privilege contains no protection against
economic loss through discharge from private employment. 71 This
absence of constitutional protection, however, does not supply a con-
clusive answer to the statutory absence. Is protection which gives but
partial immunity really coextensive? Had the Supreme Court held
the statute invalid, this conflict would have been avoided. Were the
statute found to be unconstitutional, the federal theory of government
would not have suffered attack, nor would the concept of full, co-
extensive immunity been defeated.
Physical Coercion
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Ullmann decision is its
approval of the governmental compulsion inherent in the immunity
statute. The history of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination reveals a continuing struggle against coercion.7 2 As
early as the thirteenth century, England saw the utilization of the
ecclesiastical ex officio oath.73  With this device, church authorities
were able to force the disclosure of heresy, the witnesses being re-
quired to answer truthfully to avoid the pain of excommunication.
This method of extortion of testimony was later adopted by secular
courts considering charges of crimes against the sovereign.7 4 The
application of the oath was regarded as little more than a variation of
the forms of physical torture.7 5 The revolution against the oath, in
response to the opposition of Leveller leader Lilburn, 76 culminated
in the abolition of the use of the oath in governmental or ecclesiastical
tribunals. 7 7 The use of torture, however, did not end. Torture had
proved most efficient in the English criminal process, since it was
necessary that those accused of felonies plead to the charges.78 Physi-
cal pressure caused a plea or death.7 9  Similarly, torture, or fear of
the rack, forced a defendant to confess self-incriminatory evidence late
68 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956) (dissenting
opinion).
69 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906).
70 See Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949).
71 See Claflin, The Self-Incrimination, Clause, 42 A.B.A.J. 935, 937 (1956).
72 See Note, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 294, 295 (1956).
73 See MORGAN & MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE 411 (3d ed. 1951).
74 See Moreland, Historical Background and Implications of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 44 Ky. L.J. 267, 269 (1956).
75 See McCoRmICK, EVIDEN CE 253 (1954).
76 See Trial of Lilburn and Wharton, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637).
77 See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv.
1, 9 (1949).
78 See 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 297-301 (1883).
79 See Trial'of Weston, 2 How. St. Tr. 911, 914 (1615).
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in the seventeenth century.80 There is some evidence that such
extortive methods were transplanted to the American colonies.
8
'
Certainly, the knowledge and fear of the technique of torture was
before the drafters of early American organic law.8 2 Some of them
equated the privilege against self-incrimination with the prohibition
of torture.8 3 In debates before the state conventions, called to ratify
the Federal Constitution, scattered references to the privilege demon-
strate that it was regarded merely as a privilege against physical
compulsion.8 4
The threat of coercion today is not so remote as might appear on
superficial examination. Occasional, but real, occurrences of Ameri-
can police methods employing physical compulsion 8 5 may be con-
trasted with systematic tortures prevalent in contemporary totalitarian
countries.8 6 The immunity statute, embodying mental coercion, may
now be contrasted with the "brain-washing" technique currently em-
ployed in the authoritarian nations.8 7 That the method approved by
the Court in the Ullmann case pales in comparison does not neces-
sarily refute objection to the statute as inconsistent with the intent of
the constitutional provision. In any event, the full circle has appar-
ently been turned. The mental compulsion of the ecclesiastical oath,
replaced by the privilege against self-incrimination, has now been
replaced by the mental coercion of the statute. It would follow that
the criticism directed against the immunity statute involved in th6
Ull rann case is equally applicable to all federal immunity statutes.
The effect of these compulsory testimony statutes runs contrary to
the historical background of the privilege. It may be argued further
that all such statutes are unconstitutional since they do compel-and
the Constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled." 88
However, it would not be realistic to optimistically urge the Supreme
80 See Trial of Tonge, 6 How. St. Tr. 225, 359 (1662).
81 See 3 WIGMORE, EvrDmECE 235 n.7 (3d ed. 1940).
82 See Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. RPv. 763, 775-89 (1935).
83 Pittman, supra note 82, at 783.
84 See, e.g., 2 ELLIor's DEBATES 111 (2d ed. 1937).
85 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49 (1949); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See also Comment, 6 HASTINGS LJ. 71, 74 (1954).
86 The brutality of the Nazi organization was highlighted at post-war trials.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF
Axis CRImINALiTY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 63 (1947).
87 A classic example of the use of "brain washing" may be observed through
a consideration of the great purge of communist leaders two decades ago.
The numerous convictions followed open self-accusation. A writer asks:
"How then explain the confessions of guilt in open court?" FAINSOD, How
RUSSIA is RULED 370 (1953). The highly probable answer-psychological
duress-had already been recorded by a noted authority. See KoESTLER,
DARKNESS AT NOON. The utilization of psychological duress by the commu-
nists in Korea is, of course, notorious.
88 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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Court to find the established, oft-used immunity statutes unconstitu-
tional. Perhaps the future Congress can be prevailed upon to abandon
this technique. Certainly, questionable constitutional action should be
resolved in favor of those protected by the Constitution. Utility and
national security do not justify abuse of constitutional privilege.
Conclusion
"The history of liberty is the history of limitations upon the
powers of government." 89 Likewise, the history of the privilege
against self-incrimination has been a history of reaction against au-
thority using the methods of the inquisitor.90 Just as the opposition
to the ecclesiastical oath was directed against the autocracy of both
the church and state,91 the struggle against self-incrimination was a
revolt against the tyranny of the sovereign which "pervaded every
nook and corner of the individual." 92 The Bill of Rights, which en-
compasses the privilege, had as its main purpose the restriction of a
powerful federal, centralized government. 93  As James Madison ex-
plained in support of the constitutional declaration of rights:
... the great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government,
by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the Government
ought not to act, or to act only'in a particular mode. They point these excep-
tions sometimes against the abuse of the executive power, sometimes against
the legislative, and, in some cases, against the community itself; or, in other
words, against the majority in favor of the minority.94
At the time of the consideration of the Constitution for ratification,
the wide-spread fear of federal invasion of the states' jurisdiction
prompted virtually all of the states ratifying conventions to decry
the absence of a Bill of Rights.9 5 The Bill of Rights was projected
to allay these fears. 96 These amendments, essentially negative in
construction and nature, sought to restrict tyranny.97
89 Observation of Woodrow Wilson quoted in STRONG, AMERICAN CoNsTrru-
TIONAL LAW 3 (1950).90 See McKELVEY, EVIDENCE § 300 (5th ed. 1944).
91 See MORGAN & MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE 410, 411 (3d ed. 1951). U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
92 United States v. James, 60 Fed. 257, 263 (N.D. IIl. 1894).
93 See 1 GALES & SEATON, ANNALS OF CONGRESS (1834) as quoted in
PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 108-09 (1955).
94 Id. at 113.
95 See Brownell, The Bill of Rights: Liberty and Law Are Inseparable,
41 A.B.A.J. 517 (1955) ; Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment,
42 VA. L. REv. 627, 629 (1956).
96 See CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 61 (10th ed. 1955).
97 Chief Justice Marshall has said:
". .. [I]t is universally understood, it is part of the history of the day.
that the great revolution which established the constitution of the United St-tes.
was not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively
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Exemplifying this negative concept is the fourth amendment,
which is closely and historically intertwined with the privilege against
self-incrimination. 9s The fact that, under the fourth, only unreason-
able searches by the federal government are outlawed 99-reasonable
searches being perfectly valid 0°---indicates that it was merely the
exercise of arbitrary or excessive power that was feared. A reading
of the concluding amendments 101 solidifies the appraisal of the Bill of
Rights as a delimiting document intended to reduce and restrict the
power of the federal government.
10 2
The majority states in the Ullmann case that "nothing new can
be put into the Constitution except through the amendatory process.
Nothing old can be taken out without the same process." 103 This is
inconsistent with the effect of that decision. In extending the influ-
ence of the federal government by reliance on restricted constitutional
authority, the Court has circumvented a cardinal canon of construc-
tion.10 4  The intent of the framers of the constitutional provisions has
been ignored. Although the Supreme Court once recognized that
the amendments were exclusively restrictions upon federal power, in-
tended to be "limitations upon the powers of the general govern-
ment"; 1 5 this concept has apparently been discarded. In spite of
the majority's disclaimer, judicial amendment 106 of the Constitution
entertained that those powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched
over the interests of our country, deemed essential to union, and to the attain-
ment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exer-
cised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which
the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power
were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the appre-
hended encroachments of the general government, not against those of the local
governments." Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
98 See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944) ; Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886).
99 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion ... and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
100 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ; Hipp v. United States, 156
F.2d 58 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 753 (1946) ; United
States v. Carter, 118 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
101 "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONsT. amend.
IX; U.S. COxST. amend. X.
102 See Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND.
L.J. 309 (1936).
103 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
104 "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the legislature." Melia v. Appeal Board, 78 N.W.2d 273, 275
(Mich. 1956).
101 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 582 (1840).
106 See Pittman, The Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow.
42 A.B.A.J. 509 (1956).
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has once again been effected.1' 7  The result is further encroachment
upon rights reserved to the states ' 0 5L-a trend which has characterized
recent decisions of the Supreme Court ' 9 -thus driving another
"vital blow to the very heart and framework of our constitutional
republic." 110
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Introduction
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."' The
realization of this privilege was the outgrowth of the long conflict
between those who championed the spirit of individual liberty on the
one hand and the advocates of the "collective power" of the state on
the other.2 Though, by its terms, the applicability of the constitu-
tional provision was limited to criminal cases,3 it was not long before
the courts held that it could be invoked in any federal government
proceeding where the evidence thus secured might later be used to
convict the witness of a federal crime.4 Thus, today, the privilege, if
properly invoked, will excuse one from answering questions posed in
civil cases, 5 before grand juries 6 and in depositions, 7 and also from
107 See POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION 28-33 (1956); Vaught, Amending the Constitution by Judicial Decree,
9 OKLA. L. REv. 249 (1956).
108 "It will be said that this latest development [the report of the Ullnann
case at trial level] is a dangerous usurpation of state's rights. The accuracy of
this statement will not be disputed, but in view of the past decisions of the
Supreme Court. it would seem clear that the constitutional validity of this
amendment to the statute will also be upheld by that court." 9 Sw. L.J. 474,
476 (1955).
109 See, e.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
110 Cook and Potter, The School Segregation Cases: Opposing the Opinion
of the Supreme Court, 42 A.B.A.J. 313, 391 (1956).
1 GRISWOLD, THE FFIH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
2 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
s " .. nor shall any person... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.. . ." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V (emphasis added).
4 See McCoRmIcK, EvIDENcE 259 (1954); Finkelhor and Stockdale, The
Professor and the Fifth Amendment, 16 U. PITr. L. REv. 344, 352 (1955) ; see
also cases cited notes 5-9 infra.
5 See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
6 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (dictum).
7 See Phleps v. Phleps, 133 N.J. Eq. 392, 32 A.2d 81, .83 (Ct. Err. & App.
1943) (dictum).
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